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Abstract
We examine the relative merits of targeting children within the household through
price subsidies and cash transfers. To do so, we model the behavior of a household
composed of one adult and one child. We then show that ￿ favorable￿distortions
from price subsidies may allow redistributing toward the child and then derive the
conditions under which this redistributive scheme is more e¢ cient than cash trans-
fers. The framework is extended to account for possible paternalistic preferences of
the social planner and for households composed of two adults with di⁄erent pref-
erences. Applied to a continuum of households, our approach is extended to the
problem of child poverty alleviation. In contrast to the traditional view, we show
that well-chosen subsidies may be more cost e⁄ective than cash transfers in reducing
child poverty.
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11 Introduction
The rise in child poverty is a recent source of concern for governments in developed
countries (see Dickens and Ellwood, 2003). One of the most natural policies to improve
child welfare consists in making cash transfers to families with children. Universal or
means-tested child bene￿ts are indeed in force in many industrialized countries. Yet this
instrument raises issues of agency because cash transfers are not made directly to the in-
tended recipients (i.e., children) but supplement the income of adults with the assumption
that the standard of living of children will improve as well. Even if adults and children
are altruistically linked, decisions regarding children￿ s consumption are ultimately made
by adults and the impact of cash transfers may be partially or totally neutralized by the
intra-household redistribution process. An alternative strategy to improve child welfare
consists in modifying the price structure by taxing or subsidizing some well-chosen goods.
Contrary to cash transfers, which only have an income e⁄ect on household behavior, the
change in consumer prices will create a distortion of the household consumption bun-
dle. This can be favorable to children. In the case of subsidies on child-speci￿c goods,
for instance, price cuts may induce parents to purchase these goods and hence improve
children￿ s situation.1 Yet the ￿nal impact on child welfare remains unclear since the sub-
sidies may be o⁄set by a reduction of intra-household allocations to children. To which
extent these ￿ favorable￿distortions can be used as a targeting device and be more e⁄ective
than cash transfers is an open question. More generally, and despite the large empirical
literature on child poverty, there are surprisingly little theoretical grounds to assess the
e¢ ciency of indirect taxation in the light of intra-household mechanisms.2
The present paper contributes ￿lling the gap. We suggest a simple model, in which
households comprise a benevolent adult and a child, and characterize how variations in
income and prices may a⁄ect the well-being of children and adults. By this means, we
can examine the conditions under which price subsidies (or negative taxes) improve child
1There are several examples of tax reductions on child-speci￿c goods, e.g., children￿ s clothing in
the United Kingdom and Ireland, milk and nappies in Canada, dairy products, child furniture, school
equipment and a variety of other child goods in Russia. More generally, any tax or subsidy on goods
consumed by parents and/or children may have, intentionally or not, an e⁄ect on child welfare.
2Cigno et al. (2003) present one of the rare studies that examine policies aiming to improve child
welfare. Cremer and Pestieau (2001) study the optimal non-linear taxation of bequest using a model
with altruistic parents.
2welfare and compare the cost e¢ ciency of subsidies and cash transfers. We then study
how results are altered when the social planner has paternalistic preferences and when
the household includes two parents with di⁄erent preferences. We ￿nally extend our main
results to a continuum of households, where income is the source of heterogeneity, to
show how child poverty can be a⁄ected by subsidies. While the traditional view tends to
favor cash transfers, which can be more easily targeted at the poorest, intra-household
redistribution due to price distortions provides an argument in favor of subsidies.
As we focus exclusively on child welfare and child poverty, our work can be seen as
an extension of Besley and Kanbur (1988) in the literature on targeting.3 While these
authors study the relative e⁄ects of price tax/subsidies and cash transfers on poverty
alleviation, we focus on the intra-household redistribution operated by these policies. Two
additional remarks are important to position this paper in the literature. First, we focus
on instantaneous ￿nancial poverty and not on questions and policies related to children￿ s
development, equality of opportunities and lifetime poverty. Second, our contribution is
complementary to (but does not cover the case of) in-kind bene￿ts and infra-marginal
subsidies.4 While a broad literature on cash versus in-kind transfers exists, the intra-
household implications in this ￿eld too have received little attention and should be the
object of future research (see the comments in the survey of Currie and Gahvari, 2008).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model of household
behavior and its implications on the intra-household distribution of resources. In Section
3, we compute the impact of subsidies and cash transfers on child￿ s welfare. In Section 4,
we evaluate the e¢ ciency of both policies in reducing child poverty, de￿ned according to
an original de￿nition based on the income accruing to the child. Section 5 concludes.
2 An Altruistic Model of Household Behavior
2.1 Preferences and the Decision Process
In our framework, we suppose that a household which comprises an adult (a) and a child
(c) makes decisions about consumption. For the moment, our analysis can be seen as
3See Besley (1990) and Kanbur and Stern (1987) for seminal contributions in targeting theory and
Haddad and Kanbur (1992) for an introduction to intra-household targeting.
4These bene￿ts correspond to a ration of a certain good that is given or made available below the
market price.
3restricted to lone parents ￿which is indeed a relevant focus group for child poverty ￿but,
as is explained below, the results are in fact more general. The consumption is completely
private. The n￿vectors of goods consumed by the adult and the child are denoted by
xa = (xa
1;:::;xa
n)0 and xc = (xc
1;:::;xc
n)0, respectively. The child is egoistic while the






where ua(xa) is the adult￿ s sub-utility function and uc(xc) is the child￿ s sub-utility function
such as perceived by the adult. The separability of the child￿ s consumption from the adult￿ s
one is accepted by the majority of economists, even if not without reservations (Gronau,
1988), and is a crucial component of the welfare analysis that follows. For clarity, however,
we use a slightly more restrictive form.
A1. The adult is altruistic in the sense of Becker and her total utility function is given
by W = ua(xa) + ￿uc(xc):
In the adult￿ s total utility function, ￿ > 0 represents the weight given by the adult to the
child. The functions ua(xa) and uc(xc) are strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice
continuously di⁄erentiable in all their arguments.
We suppose that the adult always gets her way. That is, as in Bourguignon (1999),
the child is a completely passive member of the household. Formally,
A2. The adult is the e⁄ective dictator in the household; she makes decision for her child.
This assumption seems reasonable for investigating economic policies that aim at reducing
poverty among young children. This also leaves room for policy intervention if the state
believes that the parent￿ s view is wrong: we shall come back to this question. For now,








c) ￿ Y; x
a ￿ 0; x
c ￿ 0 (2)
where p = (p1;:::;pn)0 is the vector of prices and Y is the household total income. Solving
￿rst order conditions yields the vector of individual demands for member g:
x
g = x
g (p;Y ) (with g = a;c): (3)
4These functions are traditional Marshallian demands and thus satisfy the Slutsky condi-
tion. Since the optimization program is additively separable, these demands have other
properties that will now be examined.
2.2 Properties of Household Demands
The separability of the adult￿ s optimization program (2) allows us to proceed with a two-
stage budgeting interpretation of the decision process. First, income is divided between
the adult and the child according to some rule; second, the consumption vectors are chosen
as if each individual maximized her own utility subject to her own share of income.
We shall ￿rst examine how the intra-household distribution of income is determined.
To do so, let vg ￿
p;￿g
￿
be the member g￿ s indirect sub-utility function where ￿g is her




a (p;￿a) + ￿v
c (p;￿c) s.t. ￿a + ￿c = Y: (4)







Once income is divided between the child and the adult, each of them maximizes her






g ￿ ￿g; x
g ￿ 0: (6)




where xg(p;￿g) is a vector of Marshallian demands, expressed as functions of p and ￿g.
To simplify notation, let ￿ = ￿c and Y ￿￿ = ￿a, where ￿(p;Y ) is the ￿ sharing rule￿ . This
function has properties that we examine below.
2.2.1 The E⁄ect of Income on the Sharing Rule
To compute the derivative of the sharing rule with respect to income, we di⁄erentiate the































g=￿g is a measure of concavity of member g￿ s sub-utility. This measure
will hereafter be referred to as the income ￿uctuation aversion of member g. Then, using






























Thus this e⁄ect is comprised between zero and one: the expenditure devoted to the child
is a normal good for the adult.5 For each additional unit of income, what is received
by the child is the ratio of the adult￿ s aversion to the sum of both members￿aversion,
i.e., more of the increase of income will accrue to the household member located on the
least curve portion of her utility function. Hence, the empirical observation of Blow et
al. (2010) that children are insured against ￿ uctuations in income simply means that the
child￿ s utility function at the equilibrium point is more concave than that of the adult.
The sum of both members￿income ￿ uctuation aversions, denoted above by ￿, has an
attractive interpretation in terms of complementarity: it corresponds to the derivative
of the benevolent parent￿ s marginal rate of substitution, computed at the equilibrium,
between the child￿ s allocation ￿ and the parent￿ s allocation Y ￿ ￿ with respect to the
relative implicit prices of child and adult allocations.6 In other words, it measures the
5This is hardly controversial. The normality of the child￿ s welfare, however, is not general but comes
from the additivity property of the adult￿ s utility function.
6Writing the index maximized by the benevolent parent as: W = va (p;￿a)+￿vc (p;￿c), we compute


























































6convexity of the preferences of the benevolent parent regarding allocations ￿ and Y ￿ ￿.
If the latter tend to be perfect substitutes (complements), the indi⁄erence curve of the
altruistic parent tends to be linear (right-angled) and ￿ tends to zero (in￿nity). The term
￿ will thus be referred to as an index of complementarity hereafter.
2.2.2 The E⁄ect of Prices on the Sharing Rule
To compute the derivative of the sharing rule with respect to prices, we di⁄erentiate the






































































































There are three terms on the right hand side of expression (12). Of course, the last term
is a ￿ conventional￿income e⁄ect: the child endowment decreases because the real income
of the household is reduced by the rise in the price of good k. The ￿rst two terms play a
major role in the derivation of optimal subsidies, and will now be examined.
2.2.3 Interpretation of (xc
k ￿ Rk)
The sum of the ￿rst two terms in expression (12) can be seen as a compensated e⁄ect of
the price pk on the sharing rule. To illustrate this point, let us remark that the sharing
7rule coincides, by de￿nition, with the expenditure made by the household on the child￿ s
consumption, that is, ￿ =
Pn
j=1 pjxc
j (p;Y ). If we di⁄erentiate this expression with respect





























is a traditional substitution term. The last term on the right-hand-side of equation (14)
is clearly the income e⁄ect described above and the ￿rst term is the variation in the
sharing rule that maintains the child￿ s utility constant. The second term is thus a money-
metric measure of the variation in the child￿ s utility induced by the price increase when
the adult￿ s total utility is maintained constant. The sum of the ￿rst two terms is the
corresponding compensated e⁄ect, that is, the change in the child￿ s share resulting from a
simultaneous variation in the price pk and in income Y that keeps the adult￿ s total utility







and compared to expression (13). It turns out that the sum of the substitution e⁄ects
weighted by the prices is proportionate to the di⁄erence between the child￿ s and the adult￿ s
Engel curves. This equivalence stems, as explained by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980),
from the separability of the adult￿ s total utility function and can be interpreted as follows.
First, remark that the real value of a marginal income unit accruing to a family member
depends on the price of the good on which this member tends to spend the income unit:
the more expensive this good, the lower the purchasing power of the marginal income
unit (Christiansen, 1983). Then, an increase in the price of good k will a⁄ect the adult￿ s
trade-o⁄ between devoting a marginal unit of income to the maximization of her own
sub-utility function or to the maximization of that of her child. The price increase will
depress both members￿purchasing powers, but more so for the child if she has a larger
propensity to spend on this good, i.e., if the slope of the Engel curve for good k is steeper
for the child than for the adult. This implies a redistribution of resources from the child
to the adult. The properties of the sharing rule and the role of the complementarity index
are further described in an example based on CARA utility functions in Appendix A.
82.2.4 The E⁄ect of Altruism on the Sharing Rule
For the sake of completeness, we also examine the e⁄ect of a change in the child￿ s weight
on the sharing rule. To do so, we di⁄erentiate the ￿rst order condition (5) with respect
































2.3 The Case of Two Parents with Opposing Interests
The present model can be interpreted in a straightforward way as a lone parent with her
child. This interpretation alone justi￿es the study that follows, since single mothers form
a particularly relevant focus group with respect to child poverty, and we stick to it in what
follows.7 However, the model can also represent situations with two adults ￿provided that
slight adjustments are made to the model ￿and with several children. To show this, let
us consider a household with two parents where the mother (m) and the father (f) have
an altruistic utility function such as described in A1. If the decision process is supposed
to lead to e¢ cient outcomes ￿according to the so-called collective approach (Browning
and Chiappori, 1998; Chiappori and Donni, 2010) ￿then there exists a bargaining weight
￿(p;Y ) such that the household objective function is













This formulation is completely standard: the bargaining weight ￿(p;Y ) represents a power
index. If ￿(p;Y ) tends to zero the father acts as a dictator in the household and, con-
versely, if it tends to one, the mother always gets his way.8 Using the Hicks-Leontie⁄
7Single parents represent around 10% of all households in the US (13 million households), 14% in
Australia, and a quarter of families with dependent children in the UK, and it should be noted that the
relative size of this group is increasing in most countries. Moreover, the prevalence of child poverty is
particularly high in this population ￿see Gornick and J￿ntti (2009).
8The fact that ￿ is the same for the mother and the father is not really important here as individual
utility functions can always be linearly transformed.
9composite good theorem, the vector of consumption goods xm and xf can be aggregated
so that the utility function of the representative adult is9
u
a(x
a;￿(p;Y )) = max
xm;xf
￿
(1 ￿ ￿(p;Y ))u
f(x












a;￿(p;Y )) + ￿u
c(x
c):
The total utility function of the adult is the same as that given in A1 except that the
representative adult￿ s utility also depends on prices and income through the bargaining
function.10 The comparative statics analysis of the preceding section thus remains valid
on the condition that the function ￿(p;Y ) is actually a constant. This is the case in tradi-
tional representations of multi-person households such as the Rotten Kid model (Becker
1974) and the Consensus model (Samuelson, 1956). More generally, it is su¢ cient to
suppose that the function ￿(p;Y ) does not depend on the price of the good on which the
subsidy is placed (the other prices remaining constant in our analysis). Indeed, if ￿(p;Y )
is independent of pk, it can easily be shown (computations are left to the reader) that the












where @￿=@Y jd￿=0 is the e⁄ect of income on the sharing rule when ￿ is maintained con-
stant.11 In general, the exclusion of the price of the subsidized good from the arguments of
the bargaining function is not an excessively restrictive assumption. In bargaining models
of household behavior ￿ la Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981)
for instance, the spouses￿bargaining position in the couple is determined by the level of
9If there are several children, it would be possible to aggregate individual child￿ s utility functions.
10Dauphin et al. (2011) consider a more general model of household behavior where children have a say
in decisions. In that case, children are characterized by speci￿c bargaining weights that depend on prices
and income. This is not our approach here because, as explained above, we focus on young children.
11If the function ￿(p;Y ) do depend on the price of good k, then an additional term will enter the
derivative of the sharing rule (17), the sign of which is a priori undetermined. This term represents the
e⁄ect of the price of good k channeled through the function ￿(p;Y ).
10utility that they can obtain when divorce is involved. Unless the e⁄ect of the price of the
subsidized good on welfare is very di⁄erent for each divorced spouse, it can be supposed
at least as an approximation that this price does not a⁄ect the bargaining function.12
3 Price Subsidies and Cash Transfers: Impact on
Child Welfare
3.1 Variations in Child Welfare
In the present section, we examine the marginal impact of price subsidies on child welfare
in a representative household. This is in line with our initial objective of studying the
targeting of speci￿c individuals within the families.13 Since the objective of the planner is
to improve the child￿ s well-being, we concentrate on the marginal impact of price subsidies,
simply de￿ned as a reduction in the free market price of one good. Yet the analysis
can be readily extended to the marginal impact of taxes (which is simply the opposite),
also of great empirical relevance. We then suppose that the planner￿ s anticipation of
the child welfare coincides with that of the adult. This assumption is relaxed later on.
Moreover, the analysis is partial in the sense that producer prices are constant. One
natural interpretation is that prices are determined by world markets.
To begin with we de￿ne a unidimensional measure of the variation in the child￿ s
standard of living. The Hicksian variation ￿dV (with a negative sign for convenience)
























12One important exception concerns the price of leisure. Indeed it is clear that wage rates signi￿cantly
a⁄ect the after-divorce situation of peoples. Hence it must also in￿ uence their bargaining position before
divorce. This is con￿rmed by empirical studies that show that the spouses￿relative earnings capacity
a⁄ect the structure of consumption of married couples; see Lundberg et alii (1997) for instance. Therefore
leisure must be excluded from the goods that can be considered in our analysis.
13We do not follow the path of optimal taxation whereby the social planner maximizes a convex
combination of parent￿ s and child￿ s welfare indices. By focusing on child welfare, we follow the literature
on targeting as explained in the introduction.
11As is usual, the opposite of the Hicksian variation can be interpreted as a monetary















3.2 The Marginal Impact of Taxes/Subsidies
The ￿rst question is then to determine whether a marginal increment of the subsidy
actually improves the child￿ s welfare and, if so, by how much. To do so, we assume that
each unity of good k is subsidized at a constant rate. Hence dsk = ￿dpk > 0 where sk
is the subsidy placed on good k. Thus, if we use expression (18) and the Roy￿ s identity,
substituting expression (12) for the derivative of the sharing rule, we obtain the marginal









The ￿rst term in this expression, xk (@￿=@Y ), is positive. This is the traditional income
e⁄ect described above. The second term, Rk, represents the distortions generated by the
subsidy and expected to be favorable to the child. As de￿ned in equation (13), it is equal
to the inverse of the complementarity index multiplied by the di⁄erence in the slopes of
the Engel curves. Speci￿cally, the subsidy will be very e⁄ective (i) if the complementarity
index is small, i.e., there is some substitutability between the child￿ s and the adult￿ s
welfares, and (ii) if the slope of the Engel curve of the child is very steep in comparison
with that of the adult (and, in particular, if good k is superior and exclusively consumed
by the child). On the contrary, if the slope of the Engel curve of the adult is large by
comparison with that of the child, the subsidy will generate ￿ bad￿distortions and may
lead to a reduction in the child￿ s well-being. Henceforth, the term Rk will be referred to
as the redistributive or targeting e⁄ect of the subsidy.
To evaluate the e⁄ectiveness of the subsidy, we have to compute its marginal impact
per unit spent by the planner. If some goods j (6= k) consumed by the household are
taxed (or subsidized), the marginal cost of the subsidy on good k will incorporate the
change in tax revenue due to the rise in the subsidy. More precisely, let us denote ￿scal
revenue as
PK
j=1 tjxj ￿ skxk, where tj is the tax rate on good j, so that good k can be














The ￿rst term in parentheses is positive, in principle, while the second term may be
positive or negative depending on whether the taxed goods are, on the whole, gross
substitutes or complements of the subsidized good. Overall, it is even possible that the
marginal cost of the subsidy is negative if tax rates on the complements of the subsidized
good are particularly high.14 To make the interpretation of the results easier, however,
we can suppose that the goods consumed by the household are not taxed.15
A3. The goods are not taxed before the introduction of the subsidy, i.e., tj = 0 for





The marginal cost of the subsidy is positive if good k is not a Gi⁄en good and its
consumption is positive. Thus, the marginal impact in terms of child￿ s welfare per unit













To gain insight into this rule, we compute the marginal welfare gain per budget unit at










Using the de￿nition of Rk, this expression o⁄ers a simple optimal rule for the practitioner
who wants to improve children￿ s welfare.
14There is one argument ￿ not completely satisfactory ￿ which is in favor of the complementarity
hypothesis. Let us suppose that tax rates are proportionate to prices, i.e., tj = ￿pj for some scalar
￿. Hence,
PK
j=1 tj@xj (p;Y )=@pk = ￿
PK
j=1 pj@xj (p;Y )=@pk = ￿￿xk from the Cournot aggregation
condition. The marginal cost of the subsidy is thus reduced accordingly.
15Alternatively, we can suppose that the derivative of the demands for the taxed goods with respect
to the price of good k is equal to zero.
13Proposition 1 Assume A1-A3. Then, starting from the no-subsidy situation, a subsidy
will be most e⁄ective in improving child welfare when put on the good for which the
di⁄erence between the slope of the Engel curve of the child and that of the adult, divided
by the level of consumption, is the largest.
3.3 The Income Elasticity Rule
To implement these results, the planner must have information about the slopes of the
Engel curves. The identi￿cation of these curves for goods consumed by both the parent
and the child from cross-sectional data is complicated but not impossible (as discussed
in the conclusion). To make things easier, however, we consider hereafter subsidizing a
good which is exclusively consumed by the child. This is a desirable situation since the
targeting e⁄ect is necessarily positive (at least if the exclusive good is normal). Thus, if




















Substituting the value (22) for the slope in the marginal impact (21) leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 (Income Elasticity Rule) Assume A1-A3 and assume that goods j
and k are exclusively consumed by the child. Then, starting from the no-subsidy situation,
a subsidy will be more e⁄ective in improving child welfare when placed on good k rather











i.e., the income elasticity of good k is greater than that of good j.
The planner has thus a simple way to select empirically the ￿ child-speci￿c￿good for
which the subsidy will have the largest e⁄ect. The intuition is simple. If the income
elasticity of the subsidized good is close to zero, the subsidy will not generate ￿ good￿
distortions (that are channeled by the intra-household redistribution of income) and its
impact will be comparable to that of a cash transfer. On the contrary, if the income
elasticity is positive and large, the subsidy will generate favorable distortions and induce
the adult to purchase a larger quantity of the subsidized good.
14The nature of the (child) goods to be targeted is an open empirical question. In the
introduction, we gave several examples of price subsidies on children￿ s clothing, nappies,
dairy products, child furniture and school equipment in operation in several countries. In
the empirical literature, and because of lack of appropriate data, there is little evidence
on the income elasticities of various child goods. One exception is the semiparametric
estimation of Engel curves for rural Pakistan in Bhalotra and Att￿eld (1998) who re-
port that child goods, including children￿ s furniture and nursery items, toys, children￿ s
footwear and pocket money, are luxuries until the very edge of the income range in their
sample. The present paper shows that these goods are of interest because it is possible
to redistribute towards children thanks to targeted price subsidies.
3.4 Price Subsidies versus Cash Transfers
We now suppose that the planner has the possibility to use lump-sum transfers, such as
child bene￿ts, as an additional instrument. The main feature of such transfers is that
they are not associated with dead weight loss. We thus question whether the increment
in the price subsidy is dominated by a similar increment in a lump-sum transfer when the
government aims to improve child welfare. To examine this issue, we suppose that dY =
dT > 0 where T is the cash transfer. This way, the marginal impact of the transfer on





The e⁄ectiveness of the lump-sum transfer is thus reduced by the fact that the derivative
of the sharing rule is less than one.
Proposition 3 Assume A1-A3. Then, for the same marginal increase in public budget,





sk + Rk ￿ 0: (24)
To see this result, we establish the di⁄erence between the welfare gain of the subsidy
and that of the cash transfer for a comparable marginal increase in public budget, i.e.,
￿ = @V=@B ￿ @V=@T. Then, using expressions (20) and (23) to simplify this expression
and using A3, we consider the case when ￿ is positive and obtain condition (24). The ￿rst
15term represents the tax leakage of the subsidy (i.e., the di⁄erence between the e⁄ect of a
marginal increase in the subsidy on the household real income, xk, and its e⁄ect on the
budget of the planner, xk ￿sk@xk (p;Y )=@pk) multiplied by the derivative of the sharing
rule, i.e., the proportion of the tax leakage supported by the child. This is not surprising
because, as is well-known, the welfare cost of a ￿scal reform that modi￿es marginal tax
rates and returns the money to the household as a cash transfer is equal to the tax leakage
(Allgood and Snow, 1998). The ￿rst term is in principle negative but counteracted by
the second term, the targeting e⁄ect. As seen before, the sign of the latter depends on
the di⁄erence between the slopes of child￿ s and adult￿ s Engel curves. Interestingly, in the
no-subsidy situation, the ￿rst term vanishes so that the marginal increase in the subsidy
has purely a targeting e⁄ect.
Proposition 4 Assume A1-A3. Then, starting from the no-subsidy situation, a subsidy
placed on a good will be more e⁄ective in improving child welfare than a cash transfer if
the targeting e⁄ect of this good is positive.
The conclusion is that a subsidy placed on ￿ well-chosen￿goods, i.e., goods with large
targeting e⁄ects, always has the potential to dominate cash transfers.
Another message from condition (24) is that there is no opportunity for intra-household
targeting through the channel of the price structure if all the individual demands possess
linear Engel curves with common slopes across household members. In this case, the
e⁄ect of a subsidy would be equivalent to that of a cash transfer. This is reminiscent of a
result by Deaton (1979) which determines under which conditions a system of di⁄erential
taxes can be optimal to attain redistributive objectives. The intuition behind this result
is that the preferences obey the Gorman polar form (Gorman, 1953) required for exact
aggregation of commodity demands. If such aggregation is possible, then we cannot use
variations in prices to distinguish among individual for purposes of redistribution.
The introduction of a subsidy will be more favorable to children than that of a cash
transfer up to the point where expression (24) is equal to zero, which de￿nes an upper
threshold s￿
















The subsidy will be more e⁄ective than the transfer as long as sk < s￿
k, i.e., the optimal
subsidy rate. The optimal subsidy rate on good k is inversely related to its own price
16elasticity and positively related to the targeting e⁄ect divided by xk. If the planner assigns
a budget B to improve child welfare, the optimal policy mix thus consists in setting the
subsidy on good k to s￿
k and distributing the rest of the public budget, B ￿s￿
kxk, as child
bene￿t (or, of course, placing a subsidy on other goods).
3.5 Additional Arguments
We present here two speci￿c arguments in favor of either price subsidies or cash transfers.
3.5.1 Paternalism and (De)merit Goods
A speci￿c e⁄ect in favor of price subsidies may occur when the government judges that the
preferences used by the adult to determine the child￿ s needs are a ￿ faulty￿representation
of the child￿ s well-being. In that case, the planner will have the objective to modify
the structure of the child￿ s consumption and not only its level. To examine this form of
paternalism, we then follow Besley￿ s (1988) approach to (de)merit goods.16 That is to
say, we suppose that the planner values the child￿ s consumption di⁄erently from the adult






with ￿ xc = ￿ ￿ xc where ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿n)0 is a vector of positive constants and ￿ is
the Hadamard product (i.e., the element-by-element product). This representation is
intuitive. If we suppose that all the ￿￿ s are equal to one except that of good k ￿in other
words, governments do respect the choices that the adult make for all the goods except
one ￿ , we can classify good k as a merit good if ￿k > 1 and a demerit good if ￿k < 1.
With this speci￿cation, the adult behaves as if she maximized the planner￿ s represen-
tation of the child￿ s utility function, though without perceiving the true system of prices
and the true sharing rule. That is, she over-estimates the price of the merit goods and
under-estimates the price of the demerit goods. The system of demand equations is:
x
c(p;￿c) = ￿ x
c(￿ p; ￿ ￿c); (26)
16In what follows, the merit of the good can be the result of externalities in consumption, lack of
information, community values and so on. See Musgrave (1987) for a de￿nition of merit goods.
17where ￿ xc(￿) is the Marshallian demand functions obtained from the planner￿ s representa-
tion of child￿ s utility ￿ uc(xc), ￿ p = ￿ ￿ p are the shadow prices of goods and
￿ ￿c = ￿c + (￿ p ￿ p)
0 x
c(p;￿c) (27)
is the shadow share of income. In Appendix B, it is shown that the marginal impact













pj (1 ￿ ￿j) ￿ ￿jk and ￿ ￿jk =
@￿ xj






c(￿ p; ￿ ￿c)
@￿ ￿c
;
that is, the marginal impact includes a new term Pk which represents the paternalistic
e⁄ect of the subsidy. Following the same argument as in section 3.4, it is now possible to





sk + (Rk + Pk) ￿ 0: (29)
To interpret this expression, let us suppose that all the ￿￿ s are equal to one except that
of good k. The paternalistic e⁄ect boils down to Pk = ￿kpk (1 ￿ ￿k) ￿ ￿kk. This term is
positive ￿and reinforces the targeting e⁄ect in condition (29) ￿if good k is a merit good,
and negative if good k is a demerit good. Alternatively, let us suppose that all the ￿￿ s
are equal to one except that of some good j (di⁄erent from good k). The paternalistic
e⁄ect becomes Pk = ￿kpj (1 ￿ ￿j) ￿ ￿jk. The sign of this term depends on whether goods
k and j are substitutes or complements. In particular, if goods k and j are substitutes
(complements), the paternalistic e⁄ect is negative (positive) for a merit good and positive
(negative) for a demerit good. To summarize this discussion, let us say that price subsidies
are particularly e⁄ective (by comparison with cash transfers) when placed on merit goods
or on goods which are complementary to some merit goods.
3.5.2 Two Parents with Con￿ icting Interests
The case of two parents with diverging views was ignored up to this point. To discuss
this extension, let us suppose that ￿(p;Y ) does not depend on pk as is explained above.
18In that simpli￿ed case, it is easy to show, from expression (17), that the welfare e⁄ect of











which is similar to expression (19) with @￿=@Y jd￿=0 instead of @￿=@Y . In addition, the
conclusions of Proposition 1 and 2 are not modi￿ed. Nonetheless, the condition under
















Hence a third term enters the condition above and modi￿es the previous conclusions. The
















Intuitively, the right-hand side of this expression will be positive if an increase in household
income improves the mother￿ s bargaining power and if the increase in bargaining power
has a positive impact on the child￿ s share of income ￿the latter assumption is usual, if
not uncontroversial. In that case, cash transfers may have a particularly strong impact
on the child￿ s welfare and dominate price subsidies even when sk is close to zero. There
is no clear evidence that @￿=@Y is positive, though. Maybe the most interesting case
is when the bargaining weight has both spouses￿incomes as speci￿c arguments, that is,
￿ = ￿(p;Ym;Yf) where Ym and Yf represent the mother￿ s and father￿ s incomes respectively
(with Ym + Yf = Y ). It seems natural to suppose that @￿=@Ym > 0 and @￿=@Yf < 0, so
that the e⁄ect of a cash transfer on the child￿ s welfare depends on who is the recipient
of the transfer. More precisely, if the transfer is paid to women, then its e⁄ectiveness is
strengthened while, if the transfer is paid to men, it is weakened.17
17Related to this is the notion of labeling according to which transfers labeled as child bene￿t are
spent disproportionately more on child goods than other incomes. Indeed recipients may use di⁄erent
mental accounts for di⁄erent expenditure categories, a phenomenon which limits the fungibility of income
and constraints consumption patterns in certain ways (Thaler, 1999). If the labeling e⁄ect is positive,
the superiority of the price subsidy is more di¢ cult to reach. Regarding this issue, empirical results
are mixed. Some studies ￿nd indeed a signi￿cant labeling e⁄ect (Kooreman, 2000, Madden, 1999) while
others do not (Edmonds, 2002).
194 Application: Targeting Child Poverty
4.1 An Original De￿nition of Child Poverty
An obvious application of the previous results is the study of child poverty. The usual
practice assumes that a poor child is one living in a poor household (e.g., a household with
income below 50% of the median). However, whether this is the case or not depends on
how income is shared within the household. Interestingly, the present framework allows
de￿ning child poverty directly in reference to the level of household resources accruing to
the child, i.e., her share ￿(p;Y ).18 Child poverty will coincide with household poverty,
measured on the basis of household income Y , only when ￿ is a linear function of Y .
In the literature on targeting, cash transfers are often preferred to price subsidies. The
former are indeed identical for all households while the gain due to a subsidy depends
on the consumption level of that good. If the good is normal, the subsidy will bene￿t
more to rich households and miss its target. This idea is presented by Besley and Kanbur
(1988). Our framework, however, provides an additional argument in favor of subsidies
when policies are used to tackle child poverty. To show this, we ￿rst assume the following.
A4. In the population, households di⁄er only with respect to the income level Y and
f(Y ) is the (well behaved) density function of household income.
We posit a poverty line zc so that children with ￿(p;Y ) 6 zc are classi￿ed as being
in poverty. Since the function ￿ is monotonically increasing in Y , there exists a value
Zc representing the level of household income at the child poverty line and implicitly
de￿ned by zc = ￿(p;Zc). As argued above, Zc does not necessarily give a poverty line for
the household as a whole or for the adult. The proportion of poor children is given by:
H =
R Zc
0 f(Y )￿dY . To aggregate information on units below the poverty line, we make





zc ￿ ￿(p;Y )
zc
￿
f(Y ) ￿ dY:
For our present concerns, this approach is very simple and convenient, even if insensitive
to the distribution of income among poor children. Further extensions could look at the
18Quite intuitively, the adult￿ s expenses devoted to children are all the more dispersed ￿and the poverty
important ￿as the children￿ s aversion to income ￿ uctuation is large.
20results when using alternative measures of poverty.
In the following, we assume that the government targets redistributive policies at
households with income below Za > Zc. That is, only the Za￿population will bene￿t
from the subsidy or the cash transfer. The proportion of households belonging to this
population is given by: G =
R Za
0 f(Y )￿dY . In practice, the choice of the means-test level
Za will depend on the information available on household incomes and children costs. We
consider two polar cases in the sequel: (i) the government is able to identify and target
households containing poor children as previously de￿ned, i.e., Za = Zc; (ii) income test
is not possible or not desirable and both cash transfers and price subsidies are universal,
i.e., Za corresponds to the highest income in the population.
4.2 Marginal Impacts of Subsidies and Transfers














































f(Y ) ￿ dY
are the demand for good k and its derivative averaged over the Za￿population. The
derivative (31) will be positive if A3 holds for all the households.
We then investigate the e⁄ect on the child poverty measure of a marginal increment










￿ f(Y ) ￿ dY
￿
;















































Rkf(Y ) ￿ dY
are the income e⁄ect and the targeting e⁄ect of the subsidy, averaged over the Zc￿
population of households with a child in poverty. The interpretation of this expression is
analogous to that of expression (20).





























f(Y ) ￿ dY:
Using these expressions, it is easy to derive the condition under which ￿ = @P=@B ￿
@P=@T is negative. This leads to the analogue of Proposition 3.
Proposition 5 Assume A1-A4. Then, for the same marginal increase in public budget,
a subsidy placed on good k is more e⁄ective than a cash transfer in reducing (the income

























The ￿rst two terms are close to those in (24) while the last term resembles that
in Besley and Kanbur (1988). The ￿rst term, corresponding to the tax leakage of the
price distortion, is negative but may be set arbitrarily small. The second term is always
positive for (normal) child-speci￿c goods. The last term, in square brackets, will generally
be negative if there is no means-test. It will be all the smaller in terms of absolute value
as we move from universal to means-tested instruments. To show this, let us assume that






￿ [Ec (xk) ￿ Ea (xk)]:
If both instruments are universal, i.e., Ea is the average over the whole population, this
expression is certainly negative since the mean consumption in families with poor children
22is less than the mean consumption in the population. In this case, the targeting e⁄ect of
price subsidies must be strong for condition (34) to be respected. On the other hand, the
means-test of redistributive policies, as often implemented in developed countries, may
considerably reduce the size of the third term. In the extreme case where the means-test
allows a perfect targeting at poor children, i.e., if Za = Zc, this last term is null and the
price subsidy is unambiguously preferred. In Appendix A, an illustration with the CARA
utility function is given.
One last remark is in order. Other forms of household heterogeneity can be incor-
porated to explain the dispersion of the child￿ s share of income. Nonetheless, the main
conclusions here are not altered as far as heterogeneity can be represented by a uni-
dimensional scalar ￿ which is monotonic in the sense that, if ￿0 is smaller than some
value ￿1, then ￿(p;Y;￿0) < ￿(p;Y;￿1). For instance, let us suppose that heterogeneity
stems from the parameter ￿ ￿the density function of which is given by f(￿) ￿that repre-
sents the degree of parent￿ s altruism. The monotonicity condition is satis￿ed here because
of inequality (15). Then it is possible to de￿ne a poverty line Zc such that for all the
households with ￿ < Zc, children will be in poverty. Following the same line of reasoning
as above, we can see that the condition (34) is still valid. The main di⁄erence is that
altruism is more di¢ cult to observe; hence universal policies are easier to implement.
5 Conclusion
Using a general representation of households with children, we study the relative merits
of price subsidies and cash transfers in targeting child welfare. We show that the e⁄ect
of price subsidies on child welfare can be broken down in, at least, an income e⁄ect and
a ￿ targeting e⁄ect￿ . For any particular good, the latter a⁄ects child welfare positively if,
and all the more so as, the slope of the Engel curve for the child is larger than that of the
adult. It comes that if the tax leakage of the subsidy is small enough compared to this
targeting e⁄ect, price subsidies dominate cash transfers. Child exclusive goods always
have positive targeting e⁄ects. Importantly, the e⁄ectiveness of a subsidy (or a tax) as a
targeting device depends on the responsiveness of individual consumptions to variations in
income. In addition, we have extended these results to the problem of poverty alleviation
in a continuum of households (with heterogeneity in income). In particular, the reduction
23in child poverty may be larger using well-chosen subsidies rather than cash transfers if
child poverty is high and the parents￿propensity to devote income to children is small.
We believe that the present framework is an original attempt to characterize policies
aimed at targeting certain individuals within the household. With the suggested model, it
becomes possible to assess the relative cost e¢ ciency of indirect taxes and, more generally,
most policy instruments that combine price and income e⁄ects to alleviate child poverty.
Naturally, future work should overcome some of the primary limitations of this contribu-
tion. Firstly, the production side has been ignored in our partial equilibrium analysis. If
the supply of subsidized goods is rigid, its price will increase as a reaction to the intro-
duction of the subsidy, canceling distortions but also the targeting e⁄ect. Secondly, our
analysis has considered only private goods, while the level of public consumption achieved
by the household can be crucial for the welfare of children. Measures of material depriva-
tion often include public durable goods. Nonetheless, it is possible to extend the present
model to public goods, as done in the collective model literature (Donni, 2009), or very
simply using Barten technology parameters to represent joint consumption (Browning et
al., 2006). Finally, we indicate in the text how results may vary when households di⁄er
not with income but with the degree of parent￿ s altruism ￿more work is however required
to introduce multi-dimensional heterogeneity.
Our concluding words concern the empirical implementation of the theoretical tools
developed in this paper. The components of the structural model that are retrieved by
simple estimations on families with children are su¢ cient to compute optimal subsidy
rates on child-speci￿c goods. In the less restrictive case where all types of goods are to
be subsidized, the targeting e⁄ect of a subsidy ￿essentially the slopes of the Engel curves
￿must be recovered empirically. To achieve this, the easiest way consists in employing a
Rothbarth-like method as described in Gronau (1991), which allows the econometrician
to recover the share of income accruing to the child, provided that at least one good
is not consumed by the child. This is the objective of on-going research (Bargain and
Donni, 2009, and Dunbar et al., 2010). The identi￿cation of the targeting e⁄ect will allow
extracting the set of (general) goods for which the subsidy will be most e⁄ective.
24Appendix A: The Case of CARA Utility Functions
To illustrate the properties of the sharing rule, let us consider the case where the utility




, for g = c;a, where ￿g(p) is
an homogeneous function of order -1 in prices p. First, the adult￿ s and the child￿ s Engel
















i.e., the impact of the income share is linear. Similarly, the child￿ s share of income is
linear and can be written as:
￿c =






thus adult￿ s altruism in￿ uences the intercept of the sharing rule but not the slope. In the
CARA speci￿cation, the individual measures of income ￿ uctuation aversion are constant
and correspond to ￿g(p), so that the complementarity index ￿ is simply equal to ￿a(p)+
￿c(p). The value of the index is not invariant to changes in measurement units, hence







k = ￿((@￿g=@pk)=￿g), and the sharing rule as ￿ = ￿1+￿2Y so that zc = ￿1+￿2Zc,
where ￿1;￿2 are the coe¢ cients de￿ned above. Let us suppose that the targeting e⁄ect is
positive for good k, that is, ac
k > aa
k. In that case, the average demand for good k over













k(1 ￿ ￿2) + a
c
k￿2)Y ]f(Y ) ￿ dY
= Ak + BkEa(Y );
where A = (ac
k ￿ aa
k)￿1 > 0 and B = (aa
k(1 ￿ ￿2) + ac
k￿2) are the parameters of the
household demand for good k. Using (32) and (33), we obtain the marginal impact of the
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25Taking the di⁄erence between these two expressions and simplifying, we demonstrate that
(from the no-subsidy situation) the subsidy is more e¢ cient than the transfer if and only
if the following condition is satis￿ed:





which simpli￿es to ￿￿2
2 [Ea(Y ) ￿ Ec(Y )] < 1 if good k is exclusively consumed by the child.
In this case, the crucial parameters are the complementarity index ￿ and the propensity
to spend total income for child￿ s welfare ￿2.
Appendix B: Paternalism and (De)merit Goods
To measure the impact of subsidies, we must compute the child￿ s indirect utility function
that takes into account the fact that the adult￿ s decisions are not optimal from the plan-
ner￿ s viewpoint. To do that, we de￿ne: ￿ vc(p;￿c) = ￿ uc(xc(p;￿c)). This is not a traditional
indirect utility function because the demands for goods are not optimal from the planner￿ s
perspective. In particular, the Roy￿ s identity does not hold. Indeed, if we di⁄erentiate
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26This relation establishes a link between the substitution e⁄ects associated to xc(p;￿c)
and ￿ xc(￿ p; ￿ ￿c) respectively. This expression as well as expression (35) above will be used
to compute the Roy Identity for the paternalistic indirect utility function. First, the
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;
is a substitution e⁄ect evaluated with the planner￿ s preferences. To interpret this expres-
sion, let us note that ￿k
PN
j=1 pj￿j￿ ￿jk = 0 from the properties of compensated demands,








pj (1 ￿ ￿j) ￿ ￿jk
!
:
Using these results and equation (18), the opposite of the Hicksian variation associated
with the subsidy rise is equal to expression (28) in the main text.
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